Abstract-A common assumption in the network coding literature is that the users are cooperative and will not pursue their own interests. However, this assumption can be violated in practice. In this paper, we analyze inter-session network coding in a wired network, assuming that the users are selfish and act as strategic players to maximize their own utility. We prove the existence of Nash equilibria for a wide range of utility functions. The number of Nash equilibria can be large (even infinite) under certain conditions, which is in sharp contrast to a similar game setting with traditional packet forwarding. We then characterize the worst-case efficiency bounds, i.e., the price-ofanarchy (PoA), compared to an optimal and cooperative network design. We show that by using a novel discriminatory pricing scheme that charges encoded and forwarded packets differently, we can improve PoA in comparison with the case where a single pricing scheme is being used. However, PoA is still worse than the case when network coding is not applied. This implies that intersession network coding is more sensitive to strategic behavior. For example, for the case where only two network coding flows share a single bottleneck link, the efficiency at certain Nash equilibria can be as low as 48%. These results generalize the well-known result of guaranteed 67% efficiency bounds shown by Johari and Tsitsiklis for traditional packet forwarding networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the seminal paper by Ahlswede et al. [1] , a rich body of work has been reported on how network coding can improve performance in both wired and wireless networks [2] - [4] . Network coding can be performed by jointly encoding multiple packets either from the same user or from different users. The former is called intra-session network coding [1] , [3] while the latter is called inter-session network coding [2] , [4] . A common assumption in most network coding schemes in the literature is that the users are cooperative and will not pursue their own interests. However, this assumption can be violated in practice. Therefore, assuming that the users are selfish and strategic, in this paper we ask the following key questions: (a) What is the impact of users' strategic behavior on network performance? (b) How does this impact change with different pricing schemes that a link can potentially choose?
It is widely accepted that pricing is an effective approach in terms of improving the efficiency of network resource allocation, especially in distributed settings. In [5] , Kelly et al. showed that if users are price takers (i.e., they treat network price as fixed), then efficient resource allocation can be achieved by properly setting congestion prices on each of the shared links. Recent work by Johari and Tsitsiklis focused on studying how the results on efficiency change in both capacity-constrained [6] and capacity-unconstrained [7] networks if users are price anticipators who realize that the price is directly impacted by each individual user's behavior. In this case, users play a game with each other, and the resource allocation is characterized by the Nash equilibrium. A key performance metric is called Price of Anarchy (PoA), i.e., the worst case efficiency loss at any Nash equilibrium due to users' strategic behavior. PoA is equal to 1 if there is no efficiency loss. A smaller PoA denotes a higher efficiency loss. Other recent work on resource allocation games include [8] and [9] . To the best of our knowledge, none of the previous work along this line took network coding into consideration.
Game theoretic analysis of network coding has received limited attention only recently, e.g., [10] - [13] . All results in [10] - [13] focus on the case of intra-session network coding, whereas here we consider inter-session network coding. In [14] , a game theoretic analysis for inter-session network coding of unicast flows on a single bottleneck link is considered. It is shown that in some classes of two-user networks, it is possible to use a link capacity allocation mechanism to achieve cooperative behavior from selfish users. In this paper, we also consider a similar network setting. However, we assume that there are N ≥ 2 users, two of which use network coding while the rest only use routing. This helps us to better understand the interaction between network coding and routing flows. The details of our results are different from those in [14] since we consider the capacity-unconstrained case instead of the capacity-constrained case in [14] . Due to the focus on the capacity region, [14] did not consider the impact of users' utility functions and issues of price anticipation and PoA.
In summary, the key contributions of this paper are:
• New problem formulation: We formulate the problem of maximizing the network aggregate surplus, i.e., the total utility of all users minus the total network cost, under inter-session network coding. As far as we know, such a problem has not been studied in the literature.
• Innovative pricing schemes: We consider two pricing schemes: non-discriminatory pricing and discriminatory pricing. The first one is the traditional approach with routing-only users, where all packets are charged with the same price. The second scheme is a novel generalization of the first one. We show that due to the special properties of network coding, discriminatory pricing is more reasonable in terms of reflecting the actual load generated by each user.
• Characterization of Nash equilibria: We show that a Nash equilibrium always exists; however, there might be many Nash equilibria in the resource allocation game with network coding. The latter is in sharp contrast to the case of the unique Nash equilibrium for the game with routing.
• Calculation of PoA: Among the two aforementioned pricing schemes, a properly chosen discriminatory pric- Fig. 1 . A single wireline bottleneck link shared by N routing flows [7] .
ing leads to a better PoA compared with the nondiscriminatory approach. We also show that the PoA is always smaller (i.e., worse) compared with the case without network coding. This implies that inter-session network coding is more sensitive to users' strategic behavior. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we summarize the recent results on resource allocation games with routing. In Section III, we extend the results to the case when users can jointly perform inter-session network coding. Conclusions and the future work are discussed in Section IV. Due to space limitation, most of the proofs are omitted.
II. RESOURCE ALLOCATION GAME WITH ROUTING FLOWS
In this section, we consider a resource allocation game in which multiple end-to-end users compete to send their packets through a single shared bottleneck link as in Fig. 1 . By construction, no inter-session network coding is performed in this case. This problem has been widely studied in [5] - [8] .
Here we summarize the key results in [7] , which presents the proper terminology, and also serves as a benchmark for our later discussions of the case with network coding.
In Fig. 1 , the shared link is denoted by (u, v) and the set of users is denoted by N = {1, . . . , N}. All packets arriving at node u are simply forwarded to node v through link (u, v). For each user n ∈ N , we denote the transmitter and receiver nodes by s n and t n , respectively. Let x n denote the transmission rate by user n ∈ N . We assume that each user n ∈ N has a utility function U n , representing its degree of satisfaction based on its achievable data rate x n . From the link's point of view, the total rate (i.e., n∈N x n ) leads to a cost characterized by a cost function C (e.g., the delay caused by the traffic). As in [7] , we make the following assumptions throughout this paper. They are satisfied by many realistic utility and delay functions such as α-fair utilities [15] and queuing delay models.
Assumption 1: For each n ∈ N , utility function U n (x n ) is concave, non-negative, strictly increasing, and differentiable.
Assumption 2: There is a differentiable, convex, and nondecreasing function p(q) over q ≥ 0, with p(0) ≥ 0 and p(q) → ∞ as q →∞, such that for each q ≥ 0, the cost is modeled as C(q)= q 0 p(z) dz. Here C(q) is convex and non-decreasing. Given complete knowledge and centralized control of the network, an efficient rate allocation can be characterized as an optimal solution of the following optimization problem:
Problem 1 (Surplus Maximization with Routing):
Notice that Problem 1 is a convex optimization problem. The objective function in Problem 1 is the network aggregate surplus [16] . In general, since the utility functions are local to the users and are not known at each link, efficient resource allocation needs to be done via pricing. Given the rate vector x = (x 1 , . . . , x N ) from the users, the shared bottleneck link (u, v) sets a single price:
for each unit of data rate it carries. Each user n ∈ N then pays x n μ(x) for its transmission rate x n . We now analyze how the users determine their rates based on the price. First assume that the users are price takers, i.e., they do not anticipate the effect of a change of their rates on the resulting price. Thus, each user n ∈ N selects its rate x n to maximize its own surplus, i.e., utility minus payment, by solving the following local optimization problem [5] :
where U n −1 denotes the inverse of the derivative of utility function U n and price μ is as in (1) . From the first fundamental theorem of welfare economics [16, pp. 326 ] if each user n ∈ N selects its rate as in (2), then at the equilibrium, the network aggregate surplus (i.e., the objective function of Problem 1) is indeed maximized (cf. [7, Proposition 1]). Next, we consider the price anticipating users where each user can anticipate the effect of its selected transmission rate on the resulting price. In this case, each user n ∈ N no longer selects its rate as in (2) . Instead, it strategically selects x n to maximize its surplus, given the knowledge that the price μ(x) is set according to (1) and is not constant. Clearly, the decision made by user n also depends on the rates selected by other users, leading to a resource allocation game among all users:
Game 1: (Resource allocation game among routing flows)
• Players: Users in set N .
• Strategies: Transmission rates x for all users.
• Payoffs: P n (x n , x −n ) for each user n ∈N , where
x n , and x −n denotes the vector of selected rates for all users other than user n. In Game 1, each user n ∈ N strategically selects its rate x n ≥ 0 to maximize its payoff function P n (x n , x −n ). A Nash equilibrium of Game 1 can be defined as a rate vector x * 0 such that for all users n ∈ N , we have
In Nash equilibrium x * , no user n ∈ N can increase its payoff by unilaterally changing its strategy x n . The following key result is from the recent work in [7] :
Theorem 1: [7, Theorem 3] Suppose that the price functions are linear, i.e., p(q) = aq for some a > 0. (a) Game 1 always has a unique Nash equilibrum.
S is an optimal solution for Problem 1 and x * is a Nash equilibrium for Game 1, then
(c) The lower bound in Part (b) is tight.
From Theorem 1, for any choice of system parameters, the network aggregate surplus obtained at the Nash equilibrium of Game 1 is at least 2 3 ≈ 0.67 of the optimal aggregate surplus. In the rest of this paper, we generalize Theorem 1 to the case where some of the users can perform inter-session network coding. We show that such a generalization is non-trivial and the results are indeed drastically different.
III. RESOURCE ALLOCATION GAME WITH INTER-SESSION NETWORK CODING AND ROUTING FLOWS

A. Problem Formulation
Consider the modified network model in Fig. 2 . It is similar to the network in Fig. 1 , except that we included two direct side links: (s 1 , t N ) from source node s 1 to destination node t N , and (s N , t 1 ) from source node s N to destination node t 1 . In this scenario, the first and the last users (i.e., users 1 and N ) can perform inter-session network coding. Let X 1 and X N denote the packets sent from source nodes s 1 and s N , respectively. The intermediate node u can encode packets X 1 and X N together, and then send the encoded packet, denoted by X 1 ⊕ X N , towards node v (and from there towards t 1 and t N ). Given the remedy data X 1 from the side link (s 1 , t N ) and the remedy data X N from the side link (s N , t 1 ), nodes t N and t 1 can decode the encoded packets that they receive. In fact, nodes t N and t 1 can both decode X 1 and X N . Clearly, the benefit of the network coding is to reduce the traffic load on the shared link (u, v) (thus reducing the link cost) while achieving the same rates. Besides Assumptions 1 and 2, here we assume that: For example, if the link cost is used to model the link delay and the side links have much larger capacity than the shared link, then the costs of the side links are small and negligible.
From now on, we refer to users 1 and N in Fig. 2 as coding users, and to users 2, . . . , N − 1 as routing users. For the network in Fig. 2 , the aggregate surplus maximization problem becomes:
Problem 2 (Surplus Maximization with Network Coding):
subject to x n ≥ 0, n = 1, . . . , N. Now let us explain the intuition behind the objective function in Problem 2. Since x 1 and x N are selected independently by users 1 and N , in general, we may have x 1 = x N . Thus, the intermediate node u can perform network coding only at rate min(x 1 , x N ). Those packets which are not encoded (e.g., with rate (s 1 , t N ) and (s N , t 1 ) are free of charge. Here x 1 and x N denote the data rates of source nodes s 1 and s N , respectively. On the other hand, X 1 and X N denote the actual packets/symbols emanated from nodes s 1 and s N , respectively. Notation X 1 ⊕ X N indicates a network coded packet/symbol obtained by jointly encoding packets X 1 and X N .
From Theorem 2, users 1 and N should have equal rates at optimality. Now let us look at the network surplus achieved at an arbitrary feasible solution. We can show the following:
Theorem 3: Letx = (x 1 , . . . ,x N ) denote any feasible (not necessarily optimal) solution for Problem 2. We have:
where U n (x n ) is the derivative of utility function U n (x n ) and
From Theorem 3, efficiency at any feasible pointx (compared to optimal point x S ) is lower bounded by the term on the right hand side of (4). This result is critical in terms of generalizing the result of Theorem 1(b).
Following the same pricing scheme as in Section II, the shared link may allocate the resource through a single price for all packets (i.e., either routed or network-coded):
Each user n ∈ N pays x n μ(x). However, this leads to double charging for encoded packets. Notice that each encoded packet includes the data from both users 1 and N . Therefore, we consider price discrimination, i.e., charging the routed and network-coded packets with different prices as explained next. Let μ(x) in (6) denote the price to charge routed packets. Under the discriminatory pricing scheme, we define another price value δ(x) for network coded packets. In general,
where 0 < α ≤ 1 is a pricing parameter. If α = 1, then there is only a single price. If α < 1, then the encoded packets are charged less than the routed packets as they carry more information compared to routing packets of the same size. In this paper, we mostly assume that α = 1 2 . This is indeed the only choice of α which avoids over or under charging.
Based on our price discrimination model, user 1 pays
From (7), the payment is (
. A similar payment model can be obtained for user N . Notice that each user n = 2, . . . , N − 1 still pays x n μ(x). We are now ready to define a resource allocation game for the network setting in Fig. 2 , when users can anticipate prices μ and δ according to (6) and (7), respectively.
Game 2: (Resource allocation game among inter-session network coding and routing flows)
• Payoffs: Q n (x n , x −n ) for each user n ∈ N . The network coding users 1 and N have:
and each routing user n ∈ N \{1, N} has
B. Existence and Non-uniqueness of Nash Equilibria
A Nash equilibrium of Game 2 with both routing and intersession network coding flows can be defined as a rate selection vector x * 0 such that for all users n ∈ N :
Theorem 4: Suppose that the prices are linear, i.e., p(q) = aq for a > 0. Let X * denote the set of all Nash equilibria for Game 2. We have: (a) Set X * is non-empty, i.e., a Nash equilibrium always exists. (b) Set X * may have several elements, i.e., a Nash equilibrium may not be unique.
The key idea of proving Theorem 4 is to directly apply Rosen's existence theorem for concave n-person games [17, Theorem 1] . In this regard, we show that for all users n ∈ N (including users 1 and N ), payoff function Q n (x n , x −n ) is a concave function with respect to x n . It is worth mentioning that although the payoff functions Q 1 and Q N are concave, they are not differentiable due to max and min functions.
From Theorem 4, the existence of Nash equilibria is still guaranteed with the possibility of network coding, even though the payoff functions (Q 1 , . . . , Q N ) in Game 2 are more complicated compared to payoffs (P 1 , . . . , P N ) in Game 1. However, as we will see, the non-uniqueness of the Nash equilibria can drastically change the results on efficiency loss.
C. Efficiency Bounds and PoA
In order to characterize the Nash equilibria of Game 2, we first need to obtain the best response for each user. That is, for each user n ∈ N we should obtain the best strategy x B n which maximizes payoff Q n given fixed x −n :
We notice that the optimization problems in (10) are convex. Thus, we can easily show the following for routing users.
Proposition 1:
For each routing user n ∈ N \{1, N}, given x N )) ; otherwise, the best response x B n is obtained as the solution of the following equation
Obtaining the best responses for network coding users 1 and N is more complicated, mostly due to non-differentiability of the payoffs functions Q 1 and Q N . In fact, user 1 should separately examine two scenarios: (a) Selecting its strategy x 1 to be greater than or equal to x N :
In that case, the corresponding best payoff is Q 1 (x B 1 , x −1 ). (b) Selecting its strategy x 1 to be less than or equal to x N :
In that case, the corresponding best payoff is
. Similar statements are true for user N . We can show the following for inter-session network coding users. 
On the other hand,x B 1 depends on whether the utility function U 1 is linear or not. For linear utility function 
The best response x B N for user N is obtained similarly. By definition, for any Nash equilibrium x * ∈ X * , where X * denotes the set of all Nash equilibria of Game 2, given x * −n , the best response for user n ∈ N is indeed its strategy at Nash equilibrium. That is, given x −n = x * −n , we have:
Thus, all Nash equilibria of Game 2 can be characterized by the best response models in Propositions 1 and 2. We notice that the best responses only depend on the first derivatives of the utility functions. Therefore, for each Nash equilibrium x * ∈X * , if we define a new collection of linear utilities:
then x * continues to be a Nash equilibrium for a new game with modified utility functionsŪ 1 (x 1 ), . . . ,Ū N (x N ) . In fact, x * is a Nash equilibrium for the family of games with utility functions U 1 (x 1 ), . . . , U N (x N ) having their first derivatives equal to U 1 (x * 1 ), . . . , U N (x * N ) at Nash equilibrium, respectively. We now apply Theorem 3 at a Nash equilibrium x * (which is a feasible solution for Problem 2). We have:
where the equality results from (11) . We can also verify that
] is the optimum of Problem 2 for linear utility functions as in (11) . Thus, the right hand side of the inequality in (12) denotes the efficiency loss for linear utilities.
On the other hand, the left hand side of the inequality in (12) denotes the efficiency loss for any choice of utility functions. These directly result in the following key result: Theorem 5: Suppose that the prices are linear. The worstcase efficiency loss at a Nash equilibrium of Game 2 occurs when the utility functions are linear for all users. That is,
where utility parameter γ n > 0 for all users n ∈ N . From Theorem 5, to obtain the worst-case efficiency loss for Game 2, it is enough to only analyze the case when all utilities are linear. We notice that for the case of linear utilities, for each user n ∈ N , the first derivative U n (x n ) = γ n . Thus, the best-responses can be obtained using Propositions 1 and 2.
We are now ready to obtain the exact values of Nash equilibria and PoA for Game 2. For the rest of this paper, we limit our study to the case where N = 2, i.e., there exists no routing user and users 1 and 2 practice inter-session network coding. We can show the following key result:
Theorem 6: Suppose that the prices are linear, that is p(q) = a q for some a > 0. Also assume that the utility functions are linear as in (13) . Consider the case when N = 2 and let x * denote a Nash equilibrium for Game 2. Without loss of generality, assume that
(c) If
From Theorem 6(a), if the slopes of linear utility functions for users 1 and 2 (i.e., γ 1 and γ 2 ) are close enough, then at Nash equilibrium, users 1 and 2 choose to have the same data rates. In that case, there are indeed infinite number of Nash equilibria ranging from and γ 2 are not close (e.g., as in the cases for Theorem 6(b) and (c)), then users 1 and 2 will choose to have different rates at the Nash equilibrium. Comparing this with the results from Theorem 2, we shall expect drastic efficiency loss, especially when γ 1 ≥ 2 α as it results in x * 2 = 0. Nash equilibria when α = 1 2 are shown in Fig. 3 . We can see that if γ 1 and γ 2 are close, Game 2 has multiple Nash equilibria (see the shaded areas). As γ 1 increases and becomes significantly larger than γ 2 , the Nash equilibrium becomes unique (e.g., for γ 1 ≥ 3 and γ 2 = 1 when α = 1 2 ). We also see that if γ 1 = γ 2 and we indeed have a symmetric network, then optimal transmission rates x S 1 = x S 2 =2 are among Nash equilibria. Theorem 7: Suppose that the prices are linear, that is p(q) = aq for some a > 0. Also assume that N = 2. (a) Let x S be any optimal solution for Problem 2 and x * be any Nash equilibrium for Game 2. If α = 1, we have:
The lower bounds in Part (a) are tight.
The proof of Theorem 7 is given in the Appendix. Theorem 7 extends the results on efficiency bounds for routing flows in Theorem 1 to the case when two inter-session network coding users share a link. We can see that even for the simple case with only two users, the efficiency bounds in Theorem 1 cannot be guaranteed anymore. From the results in Theorem 7, inter-session network coding with no price discrimination can reduce the efficiency bound from 0.67 to Fig. 4 . We can see that by using price discrimination with pricing parameter α = 1 2 , we can improve the guaranteed efficiency bound from 0.33 to 0.48. We can also see that the efficiency bounds obtained in Theorem 7 are indeed tight.
IV. CONCLUSION
This paper represents a first-step towards understanding the joint impact of network coding and strategic behavior of users on the network resource allocation efficiency. To gain insights, we focus on the case where there is a single bottleneck link in the network, and two out of N ≥ 2 users have the capability of performing inter-session network coding. We show that the results are dramatically different from the case where network coding is not taken into consideration. In particular, there can be many (even infinite) Nash equilibria in the resource allocation game, and the PoA could be much lower than the case without network coding. The precise value of the PoA , and γ 1 ≥ γ 2 = 1. If the utility parameters γ 1 and γ 2 are close (e.g., γ 2 ≤ γ 1 ≤ 3γ 2 ), then there are multiple Nash equilibria as shown in the shaded area, following the model in (14) . If γ 1 is much larger than γ 2 (e.g., γ 1 ≥ 3γ 2 ), then there is indeed a unique Nash equilibrium, following the models in (15) and (16) . Efficiency at Nash Equilibrium, α = 1 Efficiency at Nash Equilibrium, α = 0.5 Efficiency Bound, α = 1 Efficiency Bound, α = 0.5 Fig. 4 . Efficiency (PoA) at a Nash equilibrium of 200 randomly generated resource allocation game scenarios when the network topology is as in Fig. 2 , N = 2. Here we set either α = 1 or α = 1 2 . For each scenario, utility functions U 1 and U 2 as well as the pricing parameter a are selected randomly. depends on the pricing scheme used by the bottleneck link. We showed that a discriminatory pricing scheme, which charges encoded and forwarded packets differently, can improve efficiency, compared to the case of using a single price.
APPENDIX
To prove Theorem 7, we first notice that the optimal solution of Problem 2 when N = 2 is obtained as x 1 = x 2 = γ1+γ2 a . At optimality, the network aggregate surplus becomes (γ 1 + γ 2 ) 2 /(2a). Next, we shall examine efficiency loss among all the three possibilities in Theorem 6. First, assume that γ 2 ≤ γ 1 ≤ (1 + 1/α)γ 2 . In that case, the Nash equilibria are as in (14) . The worst-case Nash equilibrium is found by solving the following optimization problem 
We can show that the optimal value of the above problem is 
